

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 198998
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011
DRAFTED BY:THEODORE E RUSSELL EUR/RPE
APPROVED BY:T.E.RUSSELL EUR/RPE
S/S-O:RCASTRODALE EUR:RDVINE
EUR/SE:JMORTON

-----125687 080328Z /61

R 072114Z AUG 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0000

S E C R E T STATE 198998

EXDIS BRUSSELS FOR USEEC

FOLLOWING REPEAT ANKARA 5613 ACTION SECSTATE INFO LONDON
PARIS OTTAWA ATHENS BONN NICOSIA BRUSSELS USUN NY 04 AUG.

QUOTE: S E C R E T ANKARA 5613

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE FIVE-POWER INITIATIVE ON CYPRUS

REF STATE 190593 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT A FIVE-POWER INITIATIVE
AS NEXT STEP ON CYPRUS WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES FOR
U.S. INTERESTS HERE COMPARED TO POSSIBILITY OF CONTINUED
UNILATERAL USG EFFORTS. DILUTING US ROLE WOULD DIMINISH POTENTIAL
NEGATIVE IMPACT OF CYPRUS DEVELOPMENTS ON OUR OTHER BILATERAL
PROBLEMS, E.G. NEGOTIATIONS TO REOPEN US BASES. WE ALSO THINK
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TURKS MIGHT RESPOND BETTER TO MULTILATERAL EFFORT THAT DID NOT
CARRY IMPLICATION OF US ARM-TWISTING. WHILE DEPARTMENT'S
THINKING ON "MECHANISM" FOR INITIATIVE REMAINS OPEN, WE RECOMMEND
THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO CASTING EFFORT AS A JOINT EEC-US-
CANADIAN INITIATIVE IN ORDER TO AVOID POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS
WHICH A UN CONNECTION WOULD RAISE HERE. AN ADDED ADVANTAGE IS
THAT EEC INTEREST AT THIS MOMENT IN SEEING CYPRUS AND AEGEAN

ISSUES RESOLVED BEFORE GREEK ENTRY IS CONSIDERED LEGITIMATE
BY ALL PARTIES. END SUMMARY.

2. THIS EMBASSY WELCOMES POSSIBILITY OF FIVE-POWER INITIATIVE
AS NEXT STEP IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RESUME PROGRESS TOWARD
PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE. WE EXPECT THAT
BILATERAL US-TURKISH RELATIONS WILL BE OVER-BURDEND DURING
COMING MONTHS WITH POSSIBLY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS OVER REOPENING
OF BASES AND RENEWAL OF NORMAL ARMS-SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP.
CONTRARY TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF MANY OUTSIDE OBSERVERS, OUR
PROBLEMS WITH TURKEY MAY BE JUST BEGINNING WITH THE LIFTING
OF THE EMBARGO. POLICY GOALS AND DIRECTIVES LAID OUT IN SENATE
AND HOUSE AMENDMENTS HAVE STRUCK RAW POLITICAL NERVES HERE.
WE EXPECT TURKS WILL BE ABLE TO LIVE WITH LANGUAGE WHICH IS
LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, BUT EXPRESSION
OF CONTINUING CONGRESSIONAL DESIRE THAT USG PLAY ACTIVE ROLE
ON CYPRUS HAS RENEWED TURKISH SENSITIVITY TO THE POSSIBILITY
OF WHAT THEY MIGHT CONSIDER TO BE "UNACCEPTABLE"US PRESSURE
OVER CYPRUS. THIS CERTAINLY DOES NOT ARGUE FOR US INACTION,
BUT IT DOES MAKE THE POSSIBILITY OF SPREADING THE RISK INHERENT
IN THE FIVE-POWER INITIATIVE PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE TO US. TO
THE EXTENT
THAT OTHERS CAN BE SEEN AS OUT FRONT ON ANY DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES
OVER CYPRUS IN COMING MONTHS, OUR NEGOTIATIONS OVER A NEW DEFENSE
RELATIONSHIP WITH TURKEY WILL BE LESS ENCUMBERED.

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3. NO ONE SHOULD EXPECT THE TURKS TO
WELCOME EXTERNAL PRESSURE OVER CYPRUS IN ANY FORM; THEIGKSTRONG
PREFERENCE IS TO BE LEFT ALONE WITH GREECE AND THE GREEK
CYPRIOTS, AND THEY BELIEVE THAT THE ELIMINATION OF ALL OUTSIDE
"INTERFERENCE" WOULD NOT ONLY HELP THEM BUT ALSO SPEED A
MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION. BUT IF THERE IS TO BE AN
INITIATIVE FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA, WE BELIEVE THEY MIGHT RESPOND
BETTER TO THE EFFORTS OF A FIVE-POWER CONTACT GROUP OF WESTERN
NATIONS THAN TO THOSE OF THE USG AONE. REFTEL NOTES THAT THE
BRITISH, FRENCH, GERMANS AND CANADIANS EACH HAVE A PARTICULAR
REASON TO BE INVOLVED IN CYPRUS. WE MIGHT ADD THAT FROM THE
TURKISH VIEWPOINT THE VARIETY OF FIVE-POWER INTERESTS AND CONNECTIONS
WITH EACH OF THE TRHEE COUNTRIES OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO INFLUENCE AND LEVERAGE SPREAD MORE
EVENLY AMONG THE THREE THAN THEY BELIEVE HAS BEEN THE CASE IN
THE PAST.

4. THE "MECHANISM" BY WHICH A CONTACT GROUP IS ESTABLISHED
WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT EFFECT ON THE INITIAL TURKISH REACTION
AND MIGHT HAVE A CONTINUING INFLUENCE ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO
COOPERATE WITH IT. ANY LINKS OR PERCEIVED LINKS WITH THE SECURITY
COUNCIL WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH THE TURKS FOR AT LEAST TWO

REASONS. FIRST, THEY HAVE A GENERAL CONVICTION THAT THEY DO BADLY IN UN FORUMS; ACTIVATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN PARTICULAR, CARRIES THE CONNOTATION OF POSSIBLE "IMPLEMENTATION" OF THE VARIOUS UN RESOLUTIONS WHICH ARE SO CENTRAL TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION. SECONDLY, A FIVE-POWER CONTACT GROUP WHICH SEEMED TO EMERGE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT WELL IN SOME MINDS BE LINKED WITH KYPRIANOU'S RECENT SUGGESTION THAT THE FRENCH CHAIR A COMMITTEE OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS TO SEEK A SOLUTION. THE SIMILARITY OF THE TWO PROPOSALS WOULD NOT IMPROVE CHANCES OF TURKISH COOPERATION.

5. ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT SIMPLY BE FOR A CONTACT GROUP TO COME TOGETHER WITHOUT ANY PARTICULAR POINT OF REFERENCE BEYOND THE SHARED INTEREST OF EACH OF THE MEMBERS IN PROMOTING PROGRESS
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IN CYPRUS. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT IN THIS CASE TURKISH OBSERVERS WOULD ASSUME THAT SUCH AN AMORPHOUS GROUPING WAS SIMPLY A COVER FOR US INITIATIVES. A WASHINGTON OR NEW YORK VENUE FOR THE CONTACT GROUP WOULD CERTAINLY STRENGTHEN THIS ASSUMPTION. WHILE THIS WOULD NOT PRESENT INSUPERABLE DIFFICULTIES HERE, IT WOULD CARRY WITH IT SOME OF THE DISADVANTAGES INHERENT IN FURTHER UNILATERAL USG INITIATIVES.

6. WE THINK THAT A JOINT EEC-US-CANADIAN EFFORT MIGHT HAVE THE BEST CHANCE OF ELICITING THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. IF THE BRITISH OR GERMANS WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE SUCH AN INITIATIVE IN THE CONTEXT OF EEC CONSULTATIONS IN BRUSSELS, WE AND THE CANADIANS COULD THEN BE IN THE ENVIABLE POSITION OF RESPONDING TO AN EEC OVERTURE FOR OUR COOPERATION. FURTHER, A BRUSSELS (OR NICOSIA) VENUE FOR THE CONTACT GROUP WOULD UNDERLINE A PUBLIC IMPRESSION OF EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP, WHATEVER THE REALITIES WITHIN THE GROUP ITSELF. FINALLY, THE EEC ALREADY IS IN THE PROCESS OF WORKING OUT A PROCESS OF INTENSIFIED POLITICAL CONSULTATION WITH BOTH TURKEY AND GREECE; TAKING UP CYPRUS AS AN URGENT MATTER IN THIS PROCESS WOULD SEEM NATURAL AND WOULD CARRY LESS OF A SENSE OF UNWARRANTED, UN-INVITED WESTERN INTRUSION. CYPRUS ALSO HAS AN ASSOCIATION WITH THE EEC, SO THAT ADDING THE CYPRIOTS TO THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION (WHEN THE SUBJECT IS CYPRUS ITSELF) WOULD SEEM NATURAL. BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY SEEM TO ACCEPT AS LEGITIMATE THE EEC DESIRE TO SEE THE CYPRUS AND AEGEAN ISSUES RESOLVED BEFORE GREEK ENTRY INTO THE COMMUNITY. WHILE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MIGHT NOT BE AS LIKELY TO SEE AN EEC INITIATIVE IN A SIMILAR POSITIVE LIGHT, IT WOULD NOT PRESENT THEM AS TEMPTING A POLITICAL TARGET AS WOULD A FREE-FLOATING FIVE-POWER GROUP WHICH WOULD HAVE A STRONG NATO CASTE TO IT.

7. WE FRANKLY DON'T KNOW WHETHER THE ABOVE IDEA MAKES ANY
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SENSE IN TERMS OF EEC POLITICAL DYNAMICS OR WHETHER IT WOULD
SERVE OUR OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL NEED TO BE BOTH ACTIVE AND
AND SEEN AS ACTIVE IN PROMOTING A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER,
WE THINK SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD SERVE PRESENT US PURPOSES
HERE IN TURKEY. WE APPRECIATE BEING KEPT INFORMED OF WASHINGTON'S
THINKING ON THIS MATTER AND WOULD HOPE AT SOME POINT TO HAVE
AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON SUBSTANTIVE PAPERS WHICH MIGHT
BE ADVANCED IN THE CONTEXT OF SUCH A CONTACT GROUP.

DILLON

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INTERVENTION, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 aug 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE198998
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: THEODORE E RUSSELL EUR/RPE
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780323-0981
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780890/aaaacxf.tel
Line Count: 185
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 855c9a67-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 78 STATE 190593
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 jul 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1816608
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: POSSIBLE FIVE-POWER INITIATIVE ON CYPRUS
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, PDEV, CY, US, CA, FR, UK, GE, GR, TU
To: BRUSSELS USEEC
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/855c9a67-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014